10 Factors That Shape a Rumor’s Capacity for Online Virality

Election Integrity Partnership researchers share a threat framework adapted for election officials, analysts, and crisis communication teams.

• Online rumors about election processes and procedures can undermine trust in the democratic process. These rumors are a growing concern among researchers, journalists, and election officials, but rumors are not a new phenomenon. Decades of research provide insight into how and why rumors spread, and this knowledge can help us anticipate what kinds of rumors might emerge and which rumors have the potential for virality.

• At the Election Integrity Partnership (EIP), we have identified 10 factors that help determine a rumor’s potential to gain traction: uncertainty/ambiguity; diminished trust in media and authoritative sources of information; significance/impact; familiarity/repetition; compellingness of evidence; emotional appeal; novelty; participatory potential, origins and amplification in the social network; and inauthentic amplification or manipulation.       

• Here, we introduce a threat framework around these 10 factors and apply it to two perspectives: (1) election officials who need to anticipate rumors that may undermine the public’s confidence in the voting process; and (2) analysts and crisis communication teams who need to assess the potential virality of an emerging rumor.

Photo above: A rail car with “Rumor” graffiti by Revise Design / Flickr via CC-BY-SA-2.0.

This Election Integrity Partnership analysis was co-authored by Kate Starbird of the University of Washington’s Center for an Informed Public (UW CIP), Mike Caulfield (UW CIP), Renée DiResta of Stanford Internet Observatory, Emma S. Spiro (UW CIP), and Madeline Jalbert (UW CIP).

With 2022 U.S. midterm elections just 7 weeks away, our team at the Election Integrity Partnership (EIP), a nonpartisan coalition of researchers co-led by Stanford Internet Observatory and the University of Washington’s Center for an Informed Public, wanted to share what we have learned — and what decades of research explains — about how and why rumors spread. Scholars define rumors as unverified, unofficial pieces of information or stories that circulate from person to person (Allport and Postman, 1947; Kapferer, 1990). Though some rumors turn out to be true, many do not. In the elections context, false rumors can be harmful, e.g., by confusing people about when and where to vote or sowing doubt in election results.

Here, we present an emerging threat framework for assessing the potential virality of election-related rumors, based on existing literature and our own work, including a decade of research into online rumoring (e.g., Spiro et al., 2012; Starbird et al., 2014; Starbird et al., 2016) as well as our real-time efforts to track misinformation during the 2020 and 2022 U.S. elections. We highlight 10 specific factors, stemming from the informational conditions and events that spawn rumors; the social and emotional drivers of rumors; and the unique structures and incentives of social network information systems.

From these factors, the EIP has developed two versions of the threat framework that are adapted to (1) the perspective of election officials trying to anticipate threats related to specific parts of their election process (e.g., materials, procedures) or (2) the work of misinformation analysts trying to gauge the viral potential of an emerging narrative that risks undermining the public’s trust in voting in the 2022 midterm elections. This blog post describes these factors and the resulting threat framework in greater depth and provides additional context and important questions to ask when assessing a rumor’s potential virality.

Informational Conditions

The first two factors relate to the underlying informational conditions around an event — in this case, an election — that can stimulate the generation and dissemination of rumors. 

1. Uncertainty/Ambiguity

A primary factor in the birth and spread of rumors is uncertainty. Scholars who study rumor have long known that uncertainty powers the rumor mill (Prasad 1935; Shibutani 1966;  Kapferer 1990; DiFonzo & Bordia 2007). Similarly, foundational scholarship on rumoring (Allport & Postman, 1947) designated “ambiguity of evidence” as one of two key factors in the strength of a rumor. In uncertain and/or ambiguous informational conditions (for example, during a crisis event), people come together to try to resolve that uncertainty, participating in a natural sensemaking activity in their attempts to understand what is going on (Shibutani 1966). As they improvise and generate theories and explanations, rumors arise. These rumors are initially unsubstantiated — i.e., they can turn out to be true or false or somewhere in between. False rumors, especially in the election context, can have harmful effects.

Uncertainty can manifest as a lack of information. For example, delays in election results, though expected and often necessary, can catalyze the spread of rumors and can provide windows of opportunity for motivated actors to exploit. Uncertainty can also emerge from changing information. For example, an initially erroneous report, even if corrected quickly, can contribute to doubt about the quality of information and encourage both collective sensemaking and opportunistic exploitation. Uncertainty can also be intentionally (falsely) introduced and then exploited by malign actors to spread disinformation. 

Questions for election officials: Do you anticipate (or are you experiencing) an extended time period between the polls closing and the results being announced? Will information conditions change rapidly and updates be necessary? Are you expecting dramatic shifts in vote share (red to blue, blue to red) — e.g., due to mail-ballots being processed before or after election day ballots? Is there potential for procedural mistakes and communication errors to be made that will need to be clarified and/or corrected?

Questions for analysts: Is this rumor taking place during a period of high uncertainty (for example, while we await voting results or an official announcement)? Are authoritative sources of information available and timely? Has the rumor changed over time as new information is introduced? Is a particular narrative related to a part of the voting process where it is inherently difficult to identify what the “truth” is or what should be happening? Is the core claim “unfalsifiable”? 

2. Diminished Trust in Media and Authoritative Sources of Information

Another factor that mediates the spread of rumors is the availability of timely, quality information from trusted sources — e.g., media and government officials. If the authoritative source(s) about a particular event have high trust among the relevant audiences, for example the local fire chief during an emergency event, then the potential for a false rumor to spread can be mitigated. However, in informational environments where the official sources are not seen as trustworthy, either due to their own failures or bad-faith efforts to undermine confidence (or a combination of the two), then rumors are more likely to spread (Shibutani 1966; Fine & Ellis, 2010). One aggravating issue here is the diminishing role, especially in small cities and rural areas, of local news media — which are often viewed as more trustworthy than national news (Guess et al., 2018; Fiorone 2022) and can (if present) serve as conduits of quality, localized information about elections. The absence of timely, relevant information from trusted authoritative sources can lead to rumoring.

Questions for election officials and analysts: Are local and state election officials experiencing diminished trust, generally or among specific audiences? Have election officials (in this area) made previous errors that received public criticism? Have errors related to this part of the election process been made in the past? Does the geographical area under consideration still have local media outlets that are trusted — or do residents predominantly rely upon national news and hyperpartisan media outlets? Are authoritative sources of information generally timely and accurate?

Contextual Features

The next two factors relate to contextual features of an existing or potential rumor that may set it up for “success” in terms of spread. In the elections context, these factors focus attention onto processes, procedures, or specific locales that may be vulnerable to rumoring — e.g., because they would have significant impact on election outcomes or because those election elements have been the focus of prior rumors.

3. Significance/Impact

A third factor relates to the potential impact of the core claim within the rumor on outcomes that people care about. Allport and Postman’s “basic law of rumor” (1947) asserted that the strength of a rumor would be determined by the importance of the subject to the individual concerned, times the ambiguity of the evidence. People are more likely to engage with rumors that are relevant to them — that have potential impact, positive or negative, on their lives. We can connect this to another known factor in the spread of rumors, anxiety (Anthony 1973; DiFonzo & Bordia 2007). If the eventual outcome or facts of the matter have the potential for great impact — for example, on a close election in a swing state — then we can expect both enhanced anxiety and strategic attention to be placed on those election results or processes. Both can lead to higher levels of rumoring, and together the effect may be multiplicative. On the other hand, a rumor about a small or isolated issue with the voting process may not have viral potential, unless its adherents can convince others that it reflects a larger pattern, for example by tapping into the “participatory potential” described below. 

Questions for election officials: Do you anticipate close elections in meaningful races that shift the political power configurations at the local, state, or national level? Are there specific elements of your election procedures or materials where a systematic issue could manifest that would shift results of one or many races?

Questions for analysts: If this claim were true, would it affect a large number of votes? Would it shift results in a specific race? Would it shift the results of several races? 

4. Familiarity/Repetition

Another factor is familiarity, which can be created and reinforced through repetition. In foundational work on rumoring, Allport and Lepkin (1945) found that the best predictor of whether a rumor was believed was the number of times it had previously been heard. Indeed, the mere repetition of information is enough to increase its acceptance, a phenomenon termed the “illusory truth effect” (Hasher, Goldstein, & Toppino, 1977).

Relatedly, many rumors have common elements with previously successful rumors. Researchers explain that new rumors often rely upon “narrative templates” (or tropes) which are recycled with novel elements as new events unfold (Fine & Ellis, 2010). These familiar story elements — discarded ballots, rigged machines, or dead voters casting ballots — form a personal universe of “things that have been known to happen before,” and can confer a sense of plausibility to a rumor. And plausibility is often enough: transmission of a rumor does not require full belief in the rumor, but a level of believability. People are likely to forward rumors of which they are not fully convinced if they cohere with an individual’s sense of what happens in the world (Fine & Ellis, 2010), and the sense of what happens in the world is determined by things which they have heard before. Vulnerable audiences recognize the story, because they have heard something similar before. And if a certain claim was plausible (or even legitimate) previously, then it is plausible again. 

For election-related rumors, we can expect to see some kinds of contagion, where a rumor that spread about a certain part of the process in one part of the country, may spread again in another jurisdiction that uses similar voting procedures (for example, allegations that Sharpie pens bleed through ballots).

Questions for election officials: Are there specific parts of your election process that have been the targets of previous rumors or conspiracy theories before, perhaps in another location? Where do the building blocks of “election tropes” map to features or vulnerabilities in your election process?

Questions for analysts: Is the rumor familiar in some way? Is it based on a previous rumor or rumors about elections? Does it use a common election trope? Has a similar rumor spread successfully before? Perhaps the same claim has emerged in another location? Or the same location has experienced a different claim prior?

Engagement Potential

The next four factors relate to how engaging the rumor might be. Our modern information environments are optimized on “engagement” — shares, retweets, likes, and favorites both reflect the value of a piece of information and determine who sees it. Rumors don’t spread themselves. People spread them. And people often spread rumors (and other content online) to entertain themselves and others, as well as reap the reputational rewards of subsequent engagement. The potential to be engaging is largely determined by the content of a specific rumor, but draws its strength from the social and emotional reasons that a person might share it. 

5. Compellingness of “Evidence”

Another factor in the potential spread of a rumor is the presence of some kind of “evidence” that adds tangibility to the claim — e.g., a surveillance video, an image of a malfunctioning machine, a screenshot of erroneous election results, or the first-person experiences of a voter. This evidence may be fabricated, deliberately taken out of context, or perhaps most commonly, just misinterpreted. 

Many rumors take shape around content depicting evidence and grow with additional evidence and interpretations (Kapferer 1990), a pattern made more collaborative through social media (Krafft & Donovan, 2020). And, as the amount of supporting evidence increases, so does people’s confidence in the claim (Schwarz & Jalbert, 2020). More compelling evidence — evidence which seems to both require explanation and resist common explanations — can lead to a more compelling rumor. Images and video may be particularly compelling; at a minimum, they may pique the interest of the community and inspire the co-creation of purported plausible explanations. Kapferer (1990) noted that such detail-driven rumors are common in politics, where leaks or evidence are introduced to the public, allowing those discovering or releasing them to construct their meaning before their targets can respond. In our work, we’ve found repeated examples of perceived “weirdness” (e.g., Sharpie pen use on ballots, holes in ballot envelopes, postal workers depositing ballots in dropboxes) with mundane (actual) explanations that unfortunately reach audiences long after more malicious (false) explanations have taken root.

How such evidence comes to light can matter. First-person accounts can be compelling on their own, particularly where the source is seen to lack malicious motive, or the situation is imbued with a sense of immediacy (Fine & Turner, 2001). In our work we have seen that credibility amplified through such tropes as the “accidental witness” who stumbles on malfeasance without seeking it out (i.e., lacks motive). Once established, such claims can begin to echo through both organic and coordinated repetition (e.g., “copypasta”), often developing more complex theories around them as “interpreters” shape explanations to be more convincing and aligned to community concerns (Kapferer 1990). In a short period of time, a piece of evidence can be introduced, framed, refined, and integrated into existing narratives in ways difficult to undo. On the other hand, if the underlying evidence is easily refuted by a trusted source, that may mitigate the spread of a rumor (if done quickly).

Questions for election officials: What types of “evidence” might be leveraged in a rumor about your elections? Photos of registration notices or mail-in ballot materials? Screenshots from website or TV graphics showing “vote dumps”? Surveillance videos of vote counting processes? Schematics of voting machines? Public databases of voter registration rolls? A public website where someone can see the status of their ballot?

Questions for analysts: Is there some form of “evidence” that provides the basis for the claims? Is that evidence easy to find? Is that evidence compelling and memorable? Is there photo or video evidence? Is there data or statistical evidence? Is there a first person account? Is there a second person or “friend of a friend” account? Relatedly, is that evidence difficult to refute? Relatedly, is the evidence difficult to refute? (Alternatively, is there a clear factcheck?)

6. Emotional Appeal

A significant part of engagement potential is its capacity to stimulate an emotional response. Our emotional responses can be a major factor in the sharing of rumors (Walker & Blaine, 1991). Emotions can activate us to do something — and in online environments that often means passing along (or liking and therefore algorithmically boosting) content. Rumors that invoke a strong emotional response — from joy to anger to outage — will therefore likely spread further and faster than other rumors. This includes rumors with a humorous quality. There are reputational rewards for making other people laugh and this can motivate the sharing of rumors that are funny. But there are darker aspects to emotional appeal. In early work on rumor, Knapp (1944) noted that rumors thrived on “wish, fear, and hostility.” Similarly, Knopf saw “hostile belief systems” as a prime determinant of the impact of rumor (1975); when such hostility is present, rumors can become a tool to justify and intensify hostile beliefs by linking them to actual events. Election-related rumors that villainize specific individuals or groups (e.g., poll workers, judges, law enforcement officers, or members of a political party) in ways that evoke feelings of anger and/or disgust have the potential to spread widely among an “in-group” that shares a particular demographic or political identity. 

Questions for election officials: What are the potential pathways for anger and outrage in your jurisdiction? Who are the potential “villains” of election-related rumors: election officials, members of a political party, law enforcement officers, members of a minoritized community, poll watchers, postal workers, journalists, judges? How might anger or distrust towards those individuals or groups be leveraged to spread election-related rumors?

Questions for analysts: Does this rumor (or posts spreading this rumor) make an explicit emotional appeal? Does it invoke anger, outrage, disgust, or self-righteousness? Does it villainize a particular individual or group? Do posts spreading this rumor make an explicit mention of an out-group political party? Alternatively, is the rumor humorous?

7. Novelty

A critical factor of rumor spread is novelty. Foundational research on rumoring, conducted long before the rise of the Internet and social media, theorized that novelty determines how fast and how far a rumor spreads (Kapferer 1990). More recently, researchers of online environments have found that false news spreads faster and further than true news, in part due to the “sensational” qualities of the former (Vosoughi et al., 2018). Kapferer (1990) theorizes that the explanation for these trends may lie in the social and reputational incentives for passing a rumor along. There are social rewards for sharing new information of perceived value, but that value diminishes if others already have access to that information. This is both why rumors often spread further than “official” information, and why most rumors eventually burn out. For election-related rumors, rumors with at least some “new” element will likely spread further than rumors that everyone has heard before. 

The novelty and familiarity dimensions may seem to be at odds with each other. However, the rumors with the most potential to spread will have both — something old (a familiar element at their core that resonates with audiences, i.e., “discarded ballots were found”) and something new (to motivate sharing, i.e., “they were found in a remote ditch,” “they were found in a local dumpster”).

Questions for analysts: Is the rumor novel — i.e., new or unusual in a compelling way?

8. Participatory Potential 

Rumors are inherently participatory; particularly in the realm of politics, they serve as “the media of what goes unsaid,” a community-driven alternative space in which people discuss and make sense of things that are of interest to the community, often as an act of challenging the positions of established media and elite figures (Kapferer 1990). As we said before, rumors don’t spread themselves, people spread them. But simply resharing a rumor is only one way to participate. People can also contribute to shaping the content of a rumor as it spreads. Foundational research on rumoring (Allport & Postman 1947, Peterson & Gist 1951) describes how rumors are reshaped in their retelling through sharpening (adding or enhancing specific details) and leveling (removing some elements to make the story less complex). In online environments, participation includes adding new evidence (e.g., a person sharing their own voting experiences that align with a rumor’s claims), providing interpretations of evidence (e.g., a statistician interpreting vote count data), synthesizing related rumors into broader narratives (e.g., connecting rumors about voting issues in different locations to larger claims of fraud), adapting a rumor’s core claims to conflicting evidence, and even correcting false claims. Participation is a very active form of engagement. Rumors that provide easy avenues for a large number of people to participate will likely spread fast and far.

Questions for election officials: Are individuals or groups in your area being mobilized to gather evidence of voting issues? What are their pathways for participation (online forms, social media groups, etc.)? Is there potential for widespread misinterpretations of certain elements of your processes and procedures (e.g., Sharpie pens bleeding through ballots), or data you make available (e.g., online forms to track ballots) to create a participatory rumor?

Questions for analysts: Is this a rumor that people can easily participate in — for example by sharing their own voting experiences, taking photos of their mail-in voting materials, combing through publicly available data, or closely watching videos or election procedures?

System Effects: Networks and Algorithms 

The last set of factors relate to the structure of the information ecosystem, and especially the online systems that currently play a significant role in the development and spread of rumors. They include the mediating effects of networks and algorithms that shape how information flows across online spaces (and beyond). 

9. Origins and Amplification in the Social Network

The location of a rumor within the “social network” can play a role in how quickly and how far it spreads. Social networks consist of “ties” or relationships (e.g., familial, friendship, professional, exchange) between people (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Online, these networks often take shape more explicitly, through “following” other accounts, subscribing to a page, or participating in a group. Rumors spread through social networks, both online and off — and the structure of those networks shape their spread. Rumors that begin at the margins of social networks — e.g., in social media accounts with small numbers of followers and therefore not well connected — may have a harder time reaching the center of the conversation than rumors that begin with “influencers.” (Centola & Macy, 2007; Guilbeault & Centola, 2021; Zhang, & Centola, 2019; Lerman & Ghosh, 2010) Influencers are individuals with large audiences that include journalists, political leaders, celebrities, and an emergent class of social media all-stars who have gained audiences primarily through their social media activity. A rumor that begins with an influencer in a central position of a network is likely to spread rapidly.

Even for rumors that begin in smaller accounts at the margin of a network, as they spread, they can accumulate exposure — especially through amplification by influencers. Recent research (Centola 2021) suggests that these large accounts may serve a gatekeeping function in rumor “contagion”; influencers, for example, may see claims percolating within their communities (they are often tagged by their followers, who wish to generate lift for the claim), but must decide whether to stake their reputation on a rumor by pushing it along. In tightly connected social networks (specific communities that take shape within and across social media platforms), once a rumor reaches some of those influential accounts, it can quickly echo across the entire community. And rumors will see additional bursts as they jump from one community to the next, through structural bridges in the network (Granovetter 1973). Thus, to estimate the potential spread of a rumor, it can be valuable to measure the current spread within and across distinct communities as well as different social media platforms.

In cases where rumors begin at the margins or remain confined within a particular community, they may take longer to reach broader awareness, providing a window of opportunity for correction. In others, they may fade away before gaining significant traction. However, due to the emergent nature of both rumoring and social media dynamics, rumors that do well on other dimensions may eventually spread far and wide even when they originate in small-following accounts or websites at the far corners of the Internet.

Questions for analysts: Where did this rumor originate (a social media account, website, celebrity, or elected official)? Is the rumor currently limited to just a few posts or statements by its original source? Or is it moving beyond that original source to other social media accounts, websites, or other sources? If spreading, how much engagement has the rumor received thus far? Has the rumor reached nano- or micro- influencers (social media all-stars with 5,000-50,000 followers) within specific social networks? Has it reached the megaphones of high-follower social media accounts or media outlets with substantial audiences? Has its spread been mostly limited to a specific community within one platform? Is it spreading widely across many communities within one platform? Is it spreading across multiple platforms and communities? 

10. Inauthentic Amplification or Manipulation

The final factor we want to highlight here is the role of coordinated, and often inauthentic, amplification. Social media environments are vulnerable to manipulation — both through infiltration and intentional shaping of the social networks (the connections between accounts that shape how information flows) and through gaming of their recommendations algorithms (that dictate which users see what information, from which accounts, when). Though social media companies have made an effort to address some of these vulnerabilities, there are still pervasive issues with manipulation, e.g., by automated accounts (bots), astroturf campaigns (inauthentic accounts that coordinate to push certain messages while appearing to be authentic, grassroots activists), copypasta, and other techniques. Rumors produced or opportunistically picked up by actors who employ these techniques (or benefit from past use of these techniques, for example to build large followings) are likely to spread rapidly.

Questions for analysts: Is there evidence that this rumor is being spread by automated or inauthentic accounts? Is there a large spike in posts by very new or very similar accounts (in terms of creation date or follower count)? Is there evidence of “copypasta” — where many different accounts post very similar content? Are terms from the rumor showing up, perhaps unexpectedly, in trending topics or auto-filling in the search box?

Threat Framework

Below, we present a structured view of our threat framework, based on the 10 factors presented above, adapted for two use cases: (1) election officials working to assess their vulnerability to rumors, based on the unique dynamics in their communities and the specifics of their election processes and procedures; and (2) crisis communicators and analysts working to predict the potential virality of an emerging rumor. We plan to put (2) to use in our work this fall to identify and respond to emergent rumors about election processes and procedures. We anticipate the framework will evolve as we and others put it to use, and we welcome feedback from the community.

Framework 1: Rumor Risk Assessment for Election Officials

Download a .pdf version of this framework.

Informational Conditions

Uncertainty

• Vulnerability: Do you anticipate (or are you experiencing) an extended time period between the polls closing and the results being announced? Will information conditions change rapidly and updates be necessary? Is there potential for mistakes to be made (that will need to be corrected)? Somewhat relatedly, are you expecting dramatic shifts in vote share (red to blue, blue to red) — for example, due to mail-ballots being processed before or after election day ballots?

Diminished Trust

• Vulnerability: Are local and state election officials experiencing diminished trust, generally or among specific audiences? Have election officials (in this area) made previous errors that received public criticism? Have constituents in your area been targeted by previous rumors or rhetoric, for example by hyperpartisan media, that claims negligence or fraud? Are candidates in local and state races making misleading claims or unfounded allegations that undermine trust in election procedures and/or results? Are there specific parts of the election process that have been the target of previous criticism? Are there specific parts of the election process where errors have been made in the past?

Contextual Features

Significance / Impact

• Vulnerability: Do you anticipate close elections in meaningful races that shift the political power configurations at the local, state, or national level? Are there specific elements of your election procedures or materials where a systematic issue could manifest that would shift results of one or many races?

• For a specific rumor: If this claim were true, would it affect a large number of votes? Would it shift results in a specific (local) race? Would it shift the results of several races? Would it make an impact on nationally-relevant races (U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Senate, Presidential)?

Familiarity / Repetition

• Vulnerability: Are there specific parts of your election process that have been the targets of previous rumors or conspiracy theories before, perhaps in another location? Where do the building blocks of “election tropes” map to features or vulnerabilities in your election process?

• For a specific rumor: Is the rumor familiar in some way? Is it based on a previous rumor or rumors about elections? Does it use a common election trope? Has a similar rumor spread successfully before? Perhap the same claim has emerged in another location? Or the same location has experienced a different claim prior?

Engagement Potential

Compellingness of “Evidence”

• Vulnerability: What types of “evidence” might be leveraged in a rumor about your elections? Photos of registration notices or mail-in ballot materials? Screenshots from website or TV graphics showing “vote dumps”? Surveillance videos of vote counting processes? Schematics of voting machines? Public databases of voter registration rolls? A public website where someone can see the status of their ballot?

• For a specific rumor: Is there some form of “evidence” that provides the basis for the claims? Is that evidence compelling? Is there photo or video evidence? Is there data or statistical evidence? Is there a first person account? Is there a second person or “friend of a friend” account? Relatedly, is that evidence difficult to refute? Relatedly, is the evidence difficult to refute? (Alternatively, is there a clear factcheck?)

Emotional Valence

• Vulnerability: What are the potential pathways for anger and outrage in your jurisdiction? Who are the potential “villains” of election-related rumors: election officials, members of a political party, law enforcement officers, members of a minoritized community, poll watchers, postal workers, journalists, judges? How might anger or distrust towards those individuals or groups be leveraged to spread election-related rumors?

• For a specific rumor: Does this rumor (or posts spreading this rumor) make an explicit emotional appeal? Does it invoke anger, outrage, disgust, or self-righteousness? Does it villainize a particular individual or group? Do posts spreading this rumor make an explicit mention of an out-group political party or social/demographic group? Relatedly, is the rumor humorous?

Novelty

• For a specific rumor: Is the rumor novel — i.e., new, original, or unusual in a compelling way?

Participatory Potential

• Vulnerability: Are individuals or groups in your area being mobilized to gather evidence of voting issues? What are their pathways for participation (online forms, social media groups, etc.)? Is there potential for widespread misinterpretations of certain elements of your processes and procedures (e.g., Sharpie pens bleeding through ballots), or data you make available (e.g., online forms to track ballots) to create a participatory rumor?

• For a specific rumor: Is this a rumor that people can easily participate in — e.g., by sharing their own voting experiences, taking photos of their mail-in voting materials, combing through publicly available data, or closely watching videos or election procedures? Is there already evidence of participation — e.g., many people sharing their own experiences or unique insights?

System Effects

Origins and Amplification Within Social Network

• For a specific rumor: Where did this rumor originate (a social media account, website, celebrity, or elected official)? Is the rumor currently limited to just a few posts or statements by its original source? Or is it moving beyond that original source to other social media accounts, websites, or other sources? Has the rumor reached nano- or micro- influencers (social media all-stars with 5,000-50,000 followers) within specific social networks? Has it reached the megaphones of high-follower social media accounts or media outlets with substantial audiences? Has its spread been mostly limited to a specific community within one platform? Is it spreading widely across many communities within one platform? Is it spreading across multiple platforms and communities?

Inauthentic Amplification/Algorithmic Manipulation

• For a specific rumor: Is there evidence that this rumor is being spread by automated or inauthentic accounts? Is there a large spike in posts by very new or very similar accounts (in terms of creation date or follower count)? Is there evidence of “copypasta” — where many different accounts post very similar content? Are terms from the rumor showing up, perhaps unexpectedly, in trending topics or auto-filling in the search box?

Framework 2: Rumor Risk Assessment for Crisis Communicators

Download a .pdf version of this framework.

Informational Conditions

Uncertainty

• Is this rumor taking place during a period of high uncertainty (while we await voting results or an official announcement)? Is it related to a part of the voting process where it is inherently difficult to identify what the “truth” is? Is the core claim “unfalsifiable”?

Diminished Trust

• Are local and state election officials experiencing diminished trust, generally or among specific audiences? Have election officials (in this area) made previous errors that received public criticism? Have errors related to this part of the election process been made in the past?

Contextual Features

Significance / Impact

• If this claim were true, would it affect a large number of votes? Would it shift results in a specific (local) race? Would it shift the results of several races? Would it make an impact on nationally-relevant races (U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Senate, Presidential)?

Familiarity / Repetition

• Is the rumor familiar in some way? Is it based on a previous rumor or rumors about elections? Does it use a common election trope? Has a similar rumor spread successfully before? Perhaps the same claim has emerged in another location? Or the same location has experienced a different claim prior?

Engagement Potential

Compellingness of “Evidence”

• Is there some form of “evidence” that provides the basis for the claims? Is that evidence compelling? Is there photo or video evidence? Is there data or statistical evidence? Is there a first person account? Is there a second person or “friend of a friend” account? Relatedly, is that evidence difficult to refute? Relatedly, is the evidence difficult to refute? (Alternatively, is there a clear factcheck?)

Emotional Valence

• Does this rumor (or posts spreading this rumor) make an explicit emotional appeal? Does it invoke anger, outrage, disgust, or self-righteousness? Does it villainize a particular individual or group? Do posts spreading this rumor make an explicit mention of an out-group political party or social/demographic group? Relatedly, is the rumor humorous?

Novelty

• Is the rumor novel — i.e., new, original, or unusual in a compelling way?

Participatory Potential

• Is this a rumor that people can easily participate in — e.g., by sharing their own voting experiences, taking photos of their mail-in voting materials, combing through publicly available data, or closely watching videos or election procedures? Is there already evidence of participation — e.g., many people sharing their own experiences or unique insights?

System Effects

Origins and Amplification Within Social Network

• Where did this rumor originate (a social media account, website, celebrity, or elected official)? Is the rumor currently limited to just a few posts or statements by its original source? Or is it moving beyond that original source to other social media accounts, websites, or other sources? Has the rumor reached nano- or micro- influencers (social media all-stars with 5000-50,000 followers) within specific social networks? Has it reached the megaphones of high-follower social media accounts or media outlets with substantial audiences? Has its spread been mostly limited to a specific community within one platform? Is it spreading widely across many communities within one platform? Is it spreading across multiple platforms and communities?

Inauthentic Amplification/Algorithmic Manipulation

• Is there evidence that this rumor is being spread by automated or inauthentic accounts? Is there a large spike in posts by very new or very similar accounts (in terms of creation date or follower count)? Is there evidence of “copypasta” — where many different accounts post very similar content? Are terms from the rumor showing up, perhaps unexpectedly, in trending topics or auto-filling in the search box?

Citations 

• Allport, G. W., & Postman, L. (1947). The psychology of rumor. Henry Holt.

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